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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 08-1362

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
LACY TILLEY,
Appellant.

On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D. C. No. 06-cr-00222)
District Court Judge: Hon. Donetta W. Ambrose

Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on February 5, 2009
Before: RENDELL and ROTH, Circuit Judges
and PADOVA*, Senior District Judge
(Opinion filed: June 1, 2009)

OPINION

*Honorable John R. Padova, Senior United States District Judge for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

ROTH, Circuit Judge:
Lacy Tilley appeals from a judgment of conviction for possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The District Court had jurisdiction
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and the record of prior proceedings, which we
describe only as necessary to explain our decision. We will affirm.
First, Tilley contends that the District Court violated his Sixth Amendment rights by
setting a time limit for his testimony and, thus, preventing him from offering explanations
for the presence of firearms in his residence and for his presence in Florida in violation of
his bail. This contention is simply not supported by the record. Not only did the District
Court permit Tilley to testify after the conclusion of evidence—and after Tilley himself,
acting pro se, had stated on the record that the defense rested—but Tilley testified at length
before finally saying, “I’m done.” 1 The District Court then made certain that Tilley had no
more testimony to offer before excusing him as a witness. Additionally, despite his assertion
that he was prevented from offering explanations for the firearms and for his presence in
Florida, the record reflects that Tilley offered lengthy testimony about both of these topics.
Second, Tilley contends that his stand-by counsel rendered ineffective assistance by
(1) failing to object during certain testimony and (2) failing to stipulate to his prior conviction

1

Though the District Court initially set a twenty minute time limit for Tilley’s
testimony, the Court then permitted Tilley to address any other issues that he felt had not
been addressed adequately during the first twenty minutes.
2

for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

Once again, the record belies both of these

contentions. As an initial matter, Tilley decided to proceed pro se on the third day of his
trial, and the purportedly objectionable testimony was solicited by Tilley himself. Tilley had
no constitutional right to standby counsel, let alone a right to have standby counsel raise
objections on his behalf. See McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 178 (1984). Moreover,
even if standby counsel were capable of rendering “ineffective assistance” for Sixth
Amendment purposes, standby counsel would be under no obligation to object to testimony
solicited by a pro se defendant. In fact, such an objection would likely constitute a violation
of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. See id. (“The defendant’s appearance in the
status of one conducting his own defense is important in a criminal trial, since the right to
appear pro se exists to affirm the accused’s individual dignity and autonomy.”). Finally,
despite Tilley’s assertion to the contrary, Tilley’s attorney stipulated to his prior conviction
before Tilley decided to proceed pro se. This stipulation was derailed by Tilley’s repeated
discussion of the nature of his prior conviction during his testimony and closing argument
as a pro se defendant. Having decided to proceed pro se, Tilley cannot now “complain that
the quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of effective assistance of counsel.”
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975). Accordingly, we will affirm Tilley’s
conviction.
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